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Abstract 
Multivariate linear regression models suggest a trade-off in allocations of national R&D 
investments.  Government funding, and spending in the higher education sector, seem to 
encourage publications, whereas other components such as industrial funding, and 
spending in the business sector, encourage patenting.  Our results help explain why the 
US trails the EU in publications, because of its focus on industrial funding—some 70% 
of its total R&D investment.  Conversely, it also helps explain why the EU trails the US 
in patenting.  Government funding is indicated as a negative incentive to high-quality 
patenting. The models here can also be used to predict an output indicator for a country, 
once the appropriate input indicator is known.  This usually is done within a dataset for a 
single year, but the process can be extended to predict outputs a few years into the future, 
if reasonable forecasts can be made of the input indicators.  We provide new forecasts 
about the further relationships of the US, the EU-27, and the PRC in the case of 
publishing. Models for individual countries may be more successful, however, than 
regression models whose parameters are averaged over a set of countries. 
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Introduction 
 
A nation’s scientific establishment (innovation ecosystem) can be considered as an 
economic system that needs inputs of resources in order to produce outputs that 
contribute to national prosperity with exports, jobs, and quality of life generally.  Inputs 
to and outputs from such a system can be measured using indicators. Indicators are 
related variables that are  easier to measure.  Both authors of this study have found in a 
series of previous publications that a strong relation between input and output in science 
systems can be identified when the data is aggregated at the national level.  
 
For example, Leydesdorff (1990) regressed percentages of world share of publications in 
the Science Citation Index (SCI) as output with Gross Expenditure for R&D (GERD) 
data as an input. This latter data is provided by the Main Science and Technology 
Indicators, published twice a year by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). He noted that the advanced OECD-countries follow a common 
pattern of spending more money per paper over the years and labeled this effect as an 
R&D inflator. The marginal cost for improving one’s relative share increases each year 
even after correction for inflation by the OECD.  
 
At this time, the UK was performing above the regression line, while Japan 
underperformed in terms of returns on investment. In later studies, the measurement was 
refined by focusing on HERD (Higher Education Expenditure for R&D; Leydesdorff & 
Gauthier, 1996, p. 432) or HERD combined with GOVERD (intramural governmental 
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expenditure for R&D) as independent variables (Leydesdorff & Wagner, 2009a, p. 357; 
Zhou & Leydesdorff, 2006, p. 90).  
 
Shelton (2008) also used GERD as the independent (input) variable. Using a similar 
analysis, but independently, both Shelton & Foland (2009) and Leydesdorff & Wagner 
(2009a, at p. 356) predicted that China would surpass the United States in terms of 
internationally published articles, reviews, proceedings papers, and letters—that is, the 
citable items of the SCI—in 2014 or shortly thereafter, if growth and decline were to 
continue according to the same patterns. However, we assessed the policy implications 
very differently (Shelton, 2008; Leydesdorff & Wagner, 2009b).  
 
Perhaps, this difference of opinion reflected our differences in backgrounds and positions 
on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The long term decline of the US output in share of 
world publications despite increased R&D investment was called “the American 
Paradox” by Shelton (2008). On the other side of the ocean, one is more concerned about 
the “European Paradox:” that is, Europe seems more efficient in investing in R&D in 
terms of publications, but patenting (a proxy of innovation) has remained behind the 
levels of the US (Foland & Shelton, 2010).  
 
Dosi et al. (2006) hypothesized that the European Paradox originated in a general 
weakness in the performance of European universities. Various authors in Europe called 
for institutional reforms (Gibbons et al., 1994). Already in 1994, however, the European 
Union (EU-15) surpassed the US in terms of output—measured as world share of 
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publications in the Science Citation Index. With hindsight, this can partly be attributed to 
the German unification in 1990 (Leydesdorff, 2000). It took Germany a few years to 
obtain synergetic surplus value from adding the knowledge base of East Germany into 
the Federal Republic (Leydesdorff & Fritsch, 2006).  
 
The EU has recently been joined by twelve countries from Eastern Europe. Leydesdorff 
& Wagner (2009a, p. 359) found that the Slovak Republic now has the lowest average 
price per paper among the EU member states (US $62.7K). Japan and Austria are at the 
other end of the spectrum with prices per paper larger than US $200K. Thus, it seems that 
the EU has imported a cheaper labor force into its science system and thus gained in its 
efforts toward a knowledge-based economy (Leydesdorff, 2006).  
 
In this study, we join forces to address systematically questions such as (i) the input and 
output measures that can be used in (multivariate) regression equations, (ii) the 
differences between the two paradoxes, and (iii) the extent to which predictions can be 
made reliably on the basis of the insights thus obtained. Following Foland & Shelton 
(2010), we extend the univariate regression analysis of inputs versus publication outputs 
to multi-variate analysis, and to add patent outputs. Furthermore, we specify policy 
implications that follow from these insights about dependencies in the dynamics of the 
two competing systems at the macro-level (US and EU), and at national levels, including 
China and Japan.  
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For this purpose, we use the various OECD indicators, publication and patenting statistics 
as available either online or in publications (e.g., the Science and Engineering Indicators 
of the National Science Board of the USA; National Science Board, 2010), and combine 
this data using multi-variate regression analysis in models using one or two independent 
variables. Our approach will be a mixture of exploration using the rich data sources and 
hypotheses testing.  
 
Regression analysis cannot prove that a particular input causes an output.  However, we 
will find here that certain funding components are more strongly correlated with 
publications and patents than other components.  All researchers know that funding 
indeed is a necessary resource that empowers research and permits its outputs.  Thus, the 
findings strongly suggest connections that might be verified by other means.  All input 
and output indicators are correlated among one another, because they all tend to increase 
with the size of the country, and with time. Thus, we proceed cautiously and limit the 
analysis to a few independent variables in order not to over-fit our data.  
 
Methods and Materials 
 
a. Data sources 
 
Input indicators considered here include: (1) The number of researchers in a country; (2) 
gross domestic expenditures on research and development (GERD); (3) four GERD 
funding components: government, industry, abroad, and other; and (4) four GERD 
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spending components: higher education expenditures on R&D (HERD), business 
expenditures on R&D (BERD), government expenditures on R&D (GOVERD) and 
expenditures of non-profit institutes (other than universities).  This investment data at the 
national level is available from OECD (2010) for its 39 member countries and affiliates.  
The data is already normalized by the OECD for inflation and for purchasing power 
parity (ppp). 
 
Output indicators considered here include: (1) The annual number of scientific papers 
added to the Science Citation Index, including the Social Science Citation Index, (SCI; 
National Science Board, 2010) and Scopus (2010); and (2) three kinds of patent 
indicators: patent applications to the USPTO, patent applications in the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) system, and triadic patent annual grants (registered in all of 
these three: the USPTO, the EPO, and the Japanese Patent Office).  Most publication data 
is from the National Science Board (2010), based on fractional counts in the SCI.  Scopus 
and the Web of Science were also used through their Web interfaces for more recent 
counts of publications. 
 
Some data will not be included in the regressions.  While a series is available for the EU-
27, it is not used in regressions because most of these 27 countries are included 
individually.  (Once regression equations are derived, the EU values can be calculated 
from them.)  Some countries are omitted as outliers; e.g. the US is not included in the 
patent data from USPTO because the “home advantage” effect makes its data point 
atypical (Criscuolo, 2006).  
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 Indicators may either be absolute numbers or relative, that is, percentage shares obtained 
by dividing by totals for a set of nations included into OECD (2010), which henceforth 
we shall call the “OECD+ Group.”  This is the set of 39 nations that have a fairly 
complete set of data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
over many years (OECD, 2010).   
 
Instead of absolute numbers, percentage shares often provide more revealing values for 
national comparisons, particularly when one wishes to compare results for two or more 
time samples.  Papers published and patents granted are nearly a zero-sum game, because 
slots in journals, and the number of examiners available to process patents, do not rapidly 
change over time.  Most of these indicators slowly increase with time, and this rising tide 
tends to raise all boats, obscuring national comparisons.  For example, Thomson Reuters 
adds new journals each year to the SCI, making the database increase by some 3% per 
year (cf. Leydesdorff &Wagner, 2009b, Fig. 4, at p. 28).  Sometimes, when a nation 
increases its total number of publications in this database by 3% in a year, or even less, 
some point with pride at their nation’s performance.  However, this can be just an artifact 
of the database.   
 
Other output indicators like patents do much the same.  Thus, in analyzing and modeling 
relative positions of nations, their share of outputs is a more relevant indicator than the 
absolute totals.  However, this reasoning also applies to input indicators; since outputs are 
measured in terms of percentages of a total, modeling of the inputs that cause these 
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outputs is also best done in terms of shares.  This helps remove the effect of growth in 
time of all indicators.  Of course, once a model is built for shares, it can easily be used to 
calculate absolutes, such as the total number of a nation’s papers in the SCI. 
 
The size of nations is another confounding effect.  All inputs and outputs depend partly 
on the size of the country, which makes most country-wise correlations very high, 
obscuring identification of which variables are most important.  One can divide all 
variables by some measure of size (e.g., population; cf. Dosi et al., 2006), but stepwise 
regression can tease out which inputs are best for predicting outputs.  Independent 
variables (IVs) can be added one-by-one in order of which makes the best model for the 
prediction of the dependent variable (DV).  The first IV absorbs the spurious correlation 
for size. .     
 
Lags in time should also be considered.  For example, one can expect that research 
funding takes some years to result in a scientific paper.  There can also be a considerable 
lag between the time of patent applications and their grants, and even more from the 
initial R&D funding that enabled the invention.  However, (except for China) most 
variables do not change rapidly from year to year, and strong correlations are obtained, 
even without lags. A further extension to ARIMA time-series models (e.g., in SPSS) is 
not pursued because we would lose the multivariate perspective and the advantage of 
stepwise introduction of the independent variables (cf. Leydesdorff, 1990). 
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Once a resource input has been identified that accurately predicts an output in the past it 
might be used to formally forecast future values of that output.  This requires that the 
models be stable over time; here we usually compare models for two years: 1999 and 
2007.  It also requires a forecast of the input variables, but one is sometimes able to 
forecast these resource variables more easily than outputs because countries tend to 
change investments in R&D fairly smoothly with time. Furthermore, national 
governments sometimes publish S&T plans that state their future intentions for such 
investments. 
 
b. Regression and Interpretation 
 
While causality cannot be asserted from the results of exploring correlations and 
regression models, we proceed on the assumption that the input resources that are most 
predictive of outputs can be further examined as the most effective investments.  For 
example, a nation’s paper share of the OECD+ Group can be predicted as the dependent 
variable (DV) with a regression line that accounts for more than 95% of the variation 
using a single independent variable (IV): government R&D investment (p < 0.001). A 
similar regression with two IVs, the government and industrial funding components, will 
show that the industrial component is not significant (p > 0.05) as another IV in 
comparison.  In our opinion, it can then be suggested that government funding is more 
important than industrial funding in producing scientific papers. Such a conclusion has 
also policy implications.  
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By regression over the 39 OECD+ countries, Shelton (2008) identified some of the 
national inputs that were most important, for example the number of researchers was not 
significant compared to investment.  From the structure of the publication process, he 
built a model for individual countries in terms of shares:   
 
mi = kiwi   (1) 
 
In Equation 1, mi is the publication share, ki the relative efficiency, and wi the GERD 
share for the ith country.  This model successfully accounted for the decline of the US and 
EU after 2000 as being due to China’s rapidly increasing R&D investments.  The relative 
efficiency ki happened to be fairly constant since 1998 for the US, EU, and PRC, 
permitting useful forecasts.  As noted, Shelton and Foland (2010) used this model to 
forecast that China would soon pass the US and EU in papers in the SCI, as it already has 
in some physical science databases.   
 
Thus, this model suggested that the GERD share has been the driver of changes in paper 
share, accounting for the rise of China since 2000 (Jin and Rousseau, 2005; Leydesdorff 
& Zhou, 2006; Moed, 2002; Zhou & Leydesdorff, 2006), and the inevitable associated 
(but relative) decline of the US and EU (Leydesdorff & Wagner, 2009b).  In this 
individual country model, the relative efficiency does vary by country, and by time for 
some countries (Shelton and Foland, 2008).   
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Europe’s very high ki, however, remained a puzzle in Shelton’s original model, and the 
model could also not account for the EU passing the US in the mid-1990s.  More accurate 
models were needed that could account for Europe’s rapid increase in efficiency during 
the 1990s (Foland and Shelton, 2010).  Here, those models and similar ones for patents 
are presented in more detail.   To permit comparisons of different models, they will be 
given names.  Models for paper shares will be named Mr1, Mr2, etc., while those for 
patent share will be named Mt1, Mt2, etc. 
 
Results 
 
First, the method of stepwise inclusion of independent variables into the linear regression 
equation will be applied to the problem of predicting the shares of publications of 
nations, by searching for the IVs that best account for the dependent output variable 
(DV), that is, paper share in the SCI (including the SSCI; with fractional counts of 
articles, conference papers, and reviews; cf. National Science Board, 2010). Table 1 
presents the correlations between SCI papers—the dependent variable—and the IVs 
considered to orient us in selecting the most useful models.  The Scopus data (articles and 
reviews, for all fields) are presented only for comparison. The models will be based on 
the SCI paper shares. 
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Table 1. Correlations for Papers (N = 39 in the OECD+ Group) 
  SCI  Scopus  
  1999 2007 1999 2007
Capital vs. Labor     
 GERD 0.982 0.977 0.977 0.938
 Researchers 0.894 0.838 0.842 0.920
Funding Components     
 Industry 0.973 0.959 0.968 0.920
 Government 0.989 0.989 0.986 0.944
 Other 0.917 0.948 0.909 0.924
 Abroad 0.672 0.657 0.565 0.592
Spending Components     
 HERD 0.976 0.983 0.977 0.928
 BERD 0.980 0.968 0.975 0.927
 Non-Profits 0.925 0.975 0.914 0.951
 Gov Labs 0.985 0.961 0.984 0.938
 
 
All correlations are high because the paper output variables and all these input variables 
vary with the size of the respective countries. Thus, a similar model with a single IV 
could be constructed from any one of these measures.   However, in a linear regression 
with two IVs, only the IV with the largest correlation will usually be found to be 
significant, since it also accounts for the underlying size factor when introducing the 
second  IV.   
 
For example the 2007 regression based on the capital (GERD) and labor (Researchers) 
components as IVs for SCI paper shares (as DV) is:  
 
Mr1: Papers07 = 0.819 GERD07 - 0.0270 Researchers07 + 0.536              (R2 =  95.5%) 
 
Clearly, the investment variable (GERD) is much more useful in predicting paper share 
than the number of researchers.  Not only is the sign of the IV “Researchers” negative, 
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but it is also not significant; its p value is larger than 0.7, far higher than the commonly 
used significance level of 0.05, while that of GERD parameter is significant (p < 0.001).   
(In the following models the significance level will be one permille (p < 0.001) unless 
stated otherwise.)   
 
Since the number of researchers does not seem to add much precision, an overall 
regression model Mr2 could be built using GERD as a single input variable: 
 
 mi = Kwi + C (2) 
 
While the model in Equation 1 had a relative efficiency, ki, that differs by country, this 
model has a single average value for all countries, (capital) K, and it has a constant value 
C added.  The new model enables us to specify when countries deviate from a common 
pattern among nations.   The fit based on 2007 data is: 
 
Mr2:    Papers07 = 0.800 GERD07 + 0.492                                                    (R2 = 95.5%) 
 
As in the case of Mr1, removing the insignificant Researchers IV from the model did not 
reduce the fit in terms of the R2.  Although this model has a good overall fit to the data 
(R2= 0.955), the paper shares for the US (29.9%) and the aggregated EU-27 (35.1%) are 
still far off the regression line, which predicts 28.3% and 20.1% respectively. However, 
the model seems to be rather stable over time; the same model using 1999 data is: 
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Mr2: Papers99 =  0.785 GERD99 + 0.564                                                       (R2 = 96.5%) 
 
Table 1 and other multiple regressions indicate that the share of government funding part 
of GERD would be a more accurate predictor of papers.  This model accounts for the EU 
increase in efficiency in the 1990s, but not yet for its passing of the US in the mid-90s.   
The regression equation for 2007 is: 
 
Mr3: Papers07 = 0.846 Government07 + 0.316                                          (R2 = 97.9%) 
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Figure 1: Paper share versus government funding normalized for OECD countries 
including the outlier values of the United States and the European Union.  
 
Figure 1 shows this fit visually by drawing the regression line in Excel.3 The fit seems 
partly an artifact from drawing a line between two clusters. In Figure 2, we focus on the 
                                                 
3 The parameters of the equation are different because the EU-15 and EU-27 are included in this 
representation, while these were considered as an aggregate of individual nations in the computations using 
MiniTab and SPSS. 
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smaller countries, that is, with less than 10% on both axes and including China and 
Japan: the fit is still high and the regression remains highly significant (p < 0.001). 
 
As compared with previous analyses (Leydesdorff, 1990), Japan is placed in Figure 2 
precisely on the regression line whereas the UK has maintained its outstanding position. 
The Russian Federation is relatively underrepresented in the international literature given 
its spending on R&D. Perhaps, one could consider the vertical deviation from the 
regression line as a measure of internationalization of national science systems in terms 
of (Anglo-Saxon) publication behavior. 
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Figure 2: Paper share versus government funding normalized for OECD countries minus 
the outlier values of the United States and the EU. 
 
Figure 1 shows these values including data for the USA and the EU. Since the US has a 
greater government share: 35.6% vs. 30.1%, the predicted US share is still larger at 
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30.4%, than the EU at 25.8%,  The actual paper shares in 2007, however, were 29.9% 
and 35.1% respectively. Although these models are rather stable over time,4 adding a 
second independent variable, the higher education spending share HERD, produces a 
more accurate model than Mr3. Specifically, the model for 2007 is:  
 
Mr4:         Papers07  = 0.527 Government + 0.383 HERD + 0.127              (R2= 98.8%) 
 
Model Mr4 predicts 30.2% paper share for the US and 32.9% for EU-27, much closer to 
the actual values of 29.9% and 35.1% respectively, and demonstrates why it is reasonable 
that the EU should lead the US. 
 
For comparison the same model with 1999 data is very similar: 
 
Mr4:             Papers99  = 0.582 Government + 0.271 HERD + 0.249           (R2= 98.2%) 
 
An interesting, but simpler model based only on the HERD component as a single IV is 
successful in also predicting EU leadership in paper shares in 2007: 
 
Mr5:  Papers07 = 0.979 HERD – 0.048   (R2= 96.6%) 
 
This model predicts 28.8% share for the US and 35.4% for the EU-27 in 2007; against the 
actual values of 29.9% and 35.1%, respectively.    
                                                 
4 For comparison the same regression 1999 data is again not much different: 
 
Mr2 Papers99 = 0.795 Government + 0.376      (R2 = 97.8%) 
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 Table 2. Summary of Paper07 Regressions     
 IV1 IV2 Coeff1 Coeff2 Constant p1 p2 R2 
1 Researchers 0.789  0.521 0  70.2%
Mr1     2 GERD Researchers 0.819 -0.027 0.536 0.000 0.697 95.5%
Mr2     3 GERD  0.800  0.492 0.000  95.5%
4 Government Industry 0.774 0.067 0.330 0.000 0.351 97.9%
Mr3     5 Government 0.846  0.316 0.000  97.9%
Mr5     6 HERD  0.979  -0.048 0.000  96.6%
Mr4     7 Government HERD 0.527 0.383 0.127 0.000 0.000 98.8%
 
Table 2 summarizes the models considered.  In Row 1, one can build a single variable 
model using Researchers as the IV and produce a decent fit with R2 = 70.2%.  However, 
Rows 2 and 3 show that GERD is a much more accurate predictor IV.  Indeed, 
Researchers is not significant in comparison to GERD, and it adds no improvement to the 
fit (95.5%) over the single variable model in Row 3 (Mr2).  In Row 4, the Industry 
funding contribution is not significant in comparison to Government funding.  In Row 5 
(Mr3), the best single variable model uses the Government share of GERD funding as the 
IV, although using HERD share works almost as well (Row 6, Mr5).  The best two 
variable model in Row 7 (Mr4) uses the shares of Government funding and higher 
education spending (HERD) as IVs, and produces an excellent fit to the data (98.8%). 
 
The model in Row 4 of Table 2 highlights that Government funding (p < 0.001) is more 
effective than Industry funding in generating papers in the SCI database.5  This is hardly 
                                                 
5 For both SCI and Scopus data government funding of R&D is better than industry funding in predicting 
the national number of papers.   However, Table 1 shows that HERD and BERD have almost identical 
correlations with Scopus papers, so perhaps it is not so definite that higher education spending is better than 
business spending in producing papers.  The inclusion of more trade journals in Scopus when compared 
with the ISI set may cause this difference. Furthermore, some preliminary results from the INSPEC 
database even show a correlation with government funding lower than that of the industrial funding 
component.  This anomalous result probably comes from the narrow scope of INSPEC (mostly physical 
sciences only) compared to the much broader reach of the SCI and Scopus datasets. 
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surprising, but regression results provide quantitative evidence for this intuitively 
expected result.  However, one can draw several conclusions from the finding.  One 
implication is that nations like the US that focus on industrial funding are likely to have 
lower publication outputs per GERD dollar than nations like the UK that focus more on 
government funding (Foland and Shelton, 2010).  
 
Patent Models 
 
Patents provide another output indicator of the performance of national research 
establishments.  One complication is that most patents are awarded on a national rather 
than international basis.  While some national offices, like the US Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO), receive many international applications, the United States itself 
dominates this dataset because of its “home court” advantage.  However, the USPTO data 
is useful for evaluating the performance of other countries because the US market is 
attractive for foreign manufacturers, making US patents desirable internationally (Narin 
et al., 1997).  Indeed, in 2008 foreign patents granted by the USPTO exceeded US grants 
for the first time.   However, in regressions one normally removes such outliers as the US 
data point in this case, as being unrepresentative of the remainder of the data.   
 
Two international patent series are available from the OECD.  Triadic patents are those 
granted in all three: USPTO, European Patent Office, and the Japanese Patent Office.   
The second is patent applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), which has 
the advantage that they are much more numerous than triadic patent grants. Triadic 
 18
patents, on the one side, are considered by National Science Board (2010) as of “high 
value” because applications to three national offices are costly, so that only the most 
promising patents are pursued. On the other hand, the PCT procedure allows applicants to 
seek patent rights in a large number of countries by filing a single international 
application with a single patent office, and then enter the national stage in the desired 
countries at a later date.  These numbers are usually about three times those in the triadic 
patent series, and it will turn out that more accurate models can be based on these PCT 
patents.   
 
Table 3 shows the correlations with the IVs again, but now compared to these three series 
for patent shares.  At the two bottom lines of this table correlations between the three 
patent series are shown. Most correlations are very high, suggesting that several of the 
input variables could be used as a reasonable predictor of the output variables.  Among 
the IVs available, we focus here on those components that are most controllable by 
government policy: GERD, Researchers, the Government and Industrial funding 
components of GERD, and the HERD (higher education) and BERD (business) spending 
components of GERD.  The other components are too different between countries to 
draw as useful conclusions.    
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Table 3. Correlations for Patents (Shares)     
  Triadic Triadic USPTO USPTO PCT PCT 
  1999 2007 1999 2007 1999 2007 
Capital vs. Labor       
 GERD 0.924 0.895 0.947 0.830 0.974 0.963 
 Researchers 0.847 0.680 0.664 0.428 0.845 0.762 
Funding Components       
 Industry 0.934 0.913 0.970 0.861 0.969 0.969 
 Government 0.881 0.818 0.834 0.628 0.984 0.920 
 Other 0.940 0.900 0.930 0.902 0.882 0.939 
 Abroad 0.171 0.191 0.161 0.117 0.439 0.315 
Spending 
Components       
 HERD 0.949 0.890 0.910 0.791 0.961 0.960 
 BERD 0.921 0.905 0.966 0.852 0.977 0.966 
 Non-Profits 0.922 0.827 0.921 0.907 0.904 0.929 
 Gov Labs 0.907 0.790 0.864 0.520 0.975 0.891 
USPTO Applications       
(US removed) 0.971 0.956   0.774 0.915 
Triadic Grants   0.971 0.956 0.883 0.972 
 
Again slight differences in the correlations for the components can lead to the one with 
the lower correlation being found to be insignificant in a multivariate regression model.  
For example in all cases the component “Researchers” as IV has a lower correlation with 
all the DVs than GERD as IV.  When regressions are made with this pair of IVs, the 
“Researchers” one will again be found to be insignificant compared to the GERD 
variable.  Thus between these two, GERD seems not only to account for the country size 
factor, but to better account for other national factors. 
 
In all cases shown in Table 3, except one, Industry funding is more highly correlated with 
patenting than Government funding.  In the 1999 data for PCT patent grants, the 
Government funding is slightly higher correlated with output than the Industry variable.  
Likewise in all cases except one, the BERD spending component is more highly 
correlated with patenting than the HERD one.  In the 1999 data for Triadic patent grants, 
the HERD component is slightly higher correlated than the BERD one. 
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 a. Triadic Patents 
 
As noted, we found that the capital variable (GERD) is much more important than the 
labor variable (the number of researchers) in predicting the patent share. 
 
Mt1 Patents07 = 1.34 GERD07 – 0.465 Researchers07 + 0.327                 (R2 = 83.3%) 
 
While the parameter “Researchers” as IV is significant at the 5% level (p = 0.014), the 
sign of the component is again negative. As the correlations in Table 3 suggest, a single 
variable model can be built using the Industry funding share of GERD:  
 
Mt2:    Patents07 = 0.941 Industry07 + 0.058                       (R2 = 83.4%) 
 
The regression equation shown in Figure 3 is different from the one in Mt2 because the 
EU-27 data are weighted into this regression. The low value of the US in this case is a bit 
unexpected, but perhaps American firms patent primarily domestically. The relatively 
high values of Japan and Germany are noteworthy. Figure 4—analogously to Figure 2—
enlarges the lower-left quadrant of the figure in order to see the patterns among “smaller” 
nations. China now deviates considerably with a participation in this type of patents much 
lower than average, whereas the Korean datapoint is similar to those of other OECD 
member states. 
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Figure 3: Triadic patenting versus Industrial Funding for the OECD+ set of nations. 
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Figure 4: Triadic patenting versus Industrial Funding for “smaller” nations in the 
OECD+ set.  
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For comparison, a similar single IV regression with 1999 data has a somewhat more 
accurate fit: 
 
Mt2:    Patents99 = 0.851 Industry99 + 0.298                       (R2 = 87.2%) 
 
 
Stepwise regression, however, suggested the following model to be considered: 
 
Mt3:  Patents07 = 4.32 Industry07 – 3.46 BERD07 – 0.201            (R2 = 85.9%) 
 
The addition of the BERD component improves the fit of the regression line somewhat, 
but the negative sign is not so easy to explain.  The negative signs suggest that for a given 
level of industrial funding, additional spending by businesses or nonprofits is not useful 
when producing patents is the objective—probably because the additional components 
focus on outputs other than patenting.6  
 
Table 4. Summary of Patents07 Regressions (OECD+ set) 
 
 IV1 IV2 Coeff1 Coeff2 Constant p1 p2 R2 
Mt1     1 GERD Researchers 1.34 -0.46 0.327 0.000 0.014 83.3%
2 Industry Government 1.78 -0.973 0.438 0.000 0.000 88.6%
Mt 3    3 Industry  BERD 4.32 3.46 0.201 0.004 0.021 85.9%
Mt 4    4 Industry NonProfit 2.04 -0.653 -0.584 0.000 0.000 98.3%
5 BERD NonProfit 2.28 -0.771 -0.828 0.000 0.000 97.3%
Mt2     6 Industry  0.941  0.058 0.000  83.4%
7 BERD  0.953  0.078 0.000  81.8%
 
 
                                                 
6 For comparison, a similar two IV regression with 1999 data has a better fit than in 2007: 
 
Mt3:  Patents99 = 5.63 Industry99 – 4.82 BERD99 +0.477                    (R2 = 94.7%) 
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Table 4 summarizes the models for triadic patents in 2007.  As in the case for papers, 
Row 1 again shows that the Researchers IV is not as important as GERD investment in 
predicting patents.  Although the Researchers variable is now significant, its coefficient is 
still negative.  In contrast to the papers case, however, Row 2 shows that the Industry 
funding component now is a much better predictor of patents than the Government 
funding component.  Note that Government funding contributes negatively to patenting, 
and this relationship is significant (p < 0.001).  
 
Row 4 (Mt4) is the best two variables model, with an excellent fit of 98.3%.  However, 
these two IVs yield very different results using 1999 data, so this model does not seem to 
be stable over time.  The best single IV model is in Row 6, using just the Industry 
funding component as an IV.  Rows 6 and 7 show that Industry funding component is a 
somewhat more accurate predictor than the closely related business spending component 
(BERD) 
 
b. USPTO Patents 
 
Table 1 shows that USPTO patents are strongly correlated with the much less numerous 
triadic patents.  Thus, models of triadic patents might suffice, but a couple of models for 
the USPTO are presented here.     
 
Based on the USPTO application data in the OECD report, a fairly accurate single 
variable model can be built from the industry funding component of GERD. The “Other” 
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funding source has a slightly higher correlation, but the nature of this funding from other 
national sources differs widely among countries, and is not useful for drawing 
conclusions.  For 2007 the regression equation for share of US patents (with the US itself 
omitted) is: 
 
Mt5: USPTO07 = 0.771 Industry07 - 0.108                                                 (R2 = 74.1%) 
 
In this case, stepwise regression suggests a model with two independent variables:  
 
Mt6: USPTO07 = 1.29 Industry07 - 0.529 Researchers07 + 0.137       (R2 = 92.9%) 
 
As in the previous cases,  the Researcher IV has a negative coefficient.   
 
For reasons to be explained below, we also ran the following models with two 
independent variables:  
 
Mt7:  USPTO07 = 1.120 Industry07 – 0.616 Government07 + 0.397 (R2 = 79.3%) 
 
Despite its lower fit, this model is significant at the 1% level for the negative component 
of Government funding. When the outlier of US data is added to this set (Mt 7a), this 
effect is significant at the 1‰ level, but as stated before, this model may be over-fitted. 
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Table 5. Summary of USPTO07 Regressions (OECD+ set) 
 
 IV1 IV2 Coeff1 Coeff2 Constant p1 p2 R2 
Mt5     1 Industry  0.771 -0.108 0.000  74.1%
Mt6     2 Industry Researchers 1.29 -0.529 0.137 0.000 0.000 92.6%
Mt7     3 Industry  Government 1.12 -0.616 0.397 0.000 0.008 73.3%
Mt7a   4 Industry Government 2.055 -1.015 -0.505 0.000 0.000 96.4%
 
 
c. PCT Patents 
 
The other series available from the OECD is the number of patent applications filed 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). Table 6 shows some of the results in a 
similar format as the tables above. 
Table 6 Summary of PCT Patent Regressions in 2007 
 
 IV1 IV2 Coeff1 Coeff2 Constant p1 p2 R2 
1 GERD Researchers 1.180 -0.314 0.325 0.000 0.001 94.7%
2 Industry Government 1.040 -0.178 0.275 0.000 0.274 94.1%
3 GERD  0.946  0.101 0.000  92.8%
4 Government 0.944  0.048 0.000  84.7%
Mt8     5 Industry  0.887  0.205 0.000  93.9%
Mt9     6 BERD  0.904  0.210 0.000  93.4%
Mt10   7 BERD NonProfit 1.350 -0.256 -0.149 0.000 0.000 99.2%
 
In 2007 the best single IV model is Mt8 in Row 5. Using BERD (in Mt9, Row 6) is 
almost as accurate. The best model with two IVs, however, is Mt10 in Row 7. The same 
models are very similar when run with 1999 data.  
 
In summary, PCT patents are based more than triadic patents or USPTO patents on other 
sources of funding or spending components than industry funding. The Government 
component still contributes negatively as a second IV to the equation in Row 2, but this 
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negative contribution is no longer significant. Thus, government and funding other than 
industry (but included in BERD) may have a more stimulating effect on adding to this 
wider pool of less-competitive patents (Leydesdorff, 2008). 
 
Forecasts from Models 
 
Regression models are intended to provide the best fit for a set of data for each single 
year.  Strictly speaking, they are intended to predict the DV from IVs only for a new 
datapoint from the same population, i.e., a new country with similar characteristics and 
for the same year—as Chile as recently been added to the OECD. However, one purpose 
of this analysis is to try to develop models that can be used to forecast future values of 
DVs, particularly for the leading nations in publications and patenting.  If the parameters 
of regression models are fairly stable over time, and IVs can be predicted more easily 
than the DVs, regression models could have some utility for forecasting.  It will be seen 
that these models have only limited value in forecasting indicators for individual 
countries, unless they are made more elaborate.  Thus a different approach will be 
proposed. 
 
Direct regression of data on the time dimension is not advised because of auto-correlation 
in the data. Models which take this auto-correlation into account are more complex 
ARIMA models or of a different nature (Leydesdorff, 1990). However, one can try to fit   
the time-series in Excel, and make predictions without trying to model the underlying 
mechanisms. Figure 5, for example, shows an extrapolation of the data similar to the one 
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by Leydesdorff & Wagner (2009a, at p. 356) which made these authors state that China 
could outperform the US in 2014 if the same trends would continue. More recent data 
(2003-2010) indicate that the growth of China is no longer exponential, but linear. 
Therefore, we would prefer a linear fit and therefore be inclined to predict a 
postponement of this date to the end of this decade. 
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Figure 5: Forecast of percentage world share using extrapolation of a best fit based on 
data for 2003-2010 (cf. Leydesdorff & Wagner, 2009a, Figure 1, at p. 356).7 
 
But to explore the feasibility of extended regression models, let us try to use 2005 models 
to predict 2007 as an example values for paper share for the three leading entities: the 
US, EU, and PRC, using Government funding as the single IV. The procedure used is to: 
(1) forecast this IV by extrapolating it from its 2005 value.  The annual rate of change 
                                                 
7 Searches for 2010 were performed after the update of the database on January 22, 2011. 
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calculated over three years (2003-2005) is used as a slope; (2) The forecasted IV is then 
plugged into the model equation; (3) The model calculates a forecast for the DV for 2007.  
This can then be compared to the known actual value for 2007.   
 
The model used for SCI paper share, based on 2005 OECD data as a function of the 
Government funding component normalized across the set, is: 
 
Mr3: Paper05 = 0.840 Gov05 + 0.662                         (R2 = 96.5%) 
 
Table 7. Initial Values for the model in 2005 
 Actual % of 
Papers 
% Government 
funding 
Model forecast 
of % of Papers 
Error 
US 30.95 37.4 32.04 -1.09 
EU-27 35.41 30.4 26.20  9.21 
PRC   6.27   6.90   6.46 -0.63 
 
Table 7 shows that using this model to forecast the future would start with a handicap in 
the initial year.  The starting values for the US and PRC are fairly close, because their 
data points fall fairly near the regression line.  However, the one for EU-27 is far off the 
line, perhaps because the EU as a whole was not in the dataset, only its individual 
member states. The EU is performing in terms of papers much better than expected. 
 
Regression models are based on averages for a whole dataset. A prediction for an 
individual country may differ significantly from its actual subsequent value.  The 
scattergrams in Figures 1 to 4 illustrate this.  If a country’s data point is far off the 
regression line in one year, this may be because of other factors that still persist in 
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another year.  Thus, an individual data point may well be far off the regression line for 
the second year, even if the regression lines for the two years are close together,  
 
An example is in Table 8, which shows use of the 2005 regression line, with forecasted 
values of the IV (Government) to predict 2007 paper shares.  These are compared to the 
actual data in the last two columns.  Again the EU-27 value is far off, obviously because 
it started with a big offset.  The other two forecasts are at least accurate in trends.  They 
show the US declining and the PRC increasing, but both do so even more sharply than 
this model forecasts. 
 
Table 8. Paper forecasting parameters.  Forecast is f; actual value is a. 
 Gov05 (a) Gov07 (f) Gov07 (a) Paper07 (f) Paper07 (a) 
US 34.4 37.3 35.4 32.0 30.0 
EU-27 30.4 29.0 29.8 25.0 35.1 
PRC   6.9   7.9   8.6  7.3   8.1 
 
While this is a negative result, the defects of the model offer several clues as to how more 
accurate models can be constructed.  First one could enhance the model by adding the 
initial offset, so that at least the starting value is correct.  Then the regression line’s slope 
would more accurately forecast the changes that result when the input IV changes.  The 
effect can easily be seen by adding the Error values in the right-most column of Table 7 
to the forecasts in the Paper07 (f) column of Table 8.  The new forecast values would be:  
30.1, 34.2, and 6.7, respectively. This is much closer to the actual values of 30.0 and 35.1 
for the US and EU.  However, the difference between the lower new forecast for the PRC 
and the actual 2007 value of 8.1 actually increases.   
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 Second, since the regression line is characterized by both an intercept and slope, one can 
consider another enhancement to change the slope to more closely fit the individual 
nation.  However, this would bring us back to models for individual countries (Equation 
1) or the curve-fitting exercise underlying Figure 5. One can produce more accurate 
forecasts at the expense of using individualized model parameters for the target countries, 
instead of a composite constant for the whole dataset.  Individual country models at least 
initialize the forecast with the actual value for the starting year, removing one of the 
sources of error.  Further, instead of using a composite slope for the regression line, a 
customized slope for that country can be used.  
 
As a preliminary illustration of this method, Figure 7 shows some results for Model Mr1 
in forecasting paper share from GERD share for three large entities: the US, PRC, and 15 
countries of the EU-15.  The parameters are based on 2005 data.  To make for a more 
realistic test of the method, the GERD shares used are not the actual values, but rather 
2005 forecasts based on earlier annual rates of its increase. 
 31
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Pe
rc
en
t
US Forecast
EU15 Forecast
PRC Forecast
PRC Actual
US Actual
EU15 Actual
 
Figure 6: Accuracy of model Mr1 in forecasting paper share from GERD share.  Note 
that the GERD share is forecast from the 2005 values.    
 
These results are more useful.  The main discrepancy shown is that the forecast value for 
the PRC is slightly below the actual values, which can be attributed to the fact that 
China’s actual input GERD share has increased somewhat more than forecasted by 
extrapolation of IV trends before 2005. Using this forecast, the PRC would overtake the 
US some years earlier than using the extrapolations of Figure 5. Model Mr1 continues to 
be accurate for forecasts because the relative efficiency parameter (ki) continues to be 
fairly flat for these three units of analysis (EU, USA, and PRC). 
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Conclusions 
 
The modeling process identified which resource IVs are most useful in predicting 
outputs, and shed some light on which investments are productive in enhancing these 
outputs.  The analysis strongly suggests, although it cannot prove, that certain 
components of national R&D spending are more effective than others in producing 
papers and patents.  The two components are complementary.  That is, the Government 
funding and higher education spending is most effective in encouraging paper production.  
Industrial funding and business spending are conversely most effective in encouraging 
patent production.  These findings are not surprising, but the regression models provide 
some quantitative evidence of their truth. 
 
The model outcomes suggest that the Government funding component functions as a 
negative incentive to high-quality patenting. Because of the costs involved, corporations 
may be hesitant to invest in patents which were “not-invented-here,” but these results can 
also be considered in the light of the continuous debate about the quality of university 
patents (Henderson et al., 1998; Leydesdorff & Meyer, 2010; Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002; 
Sampat et al., 2003). Perhaps, legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act stimulates patenting 
for institutional reasons and hence may have undesirable institutional effects more than 
substantive contributions to industrial innovation (Mowery et al., 2003). 
 
The models, furthermore, can shed light on the questions posed in the Introduction.  The 
increases in publication efficiency in countries like the EU in the 1990s can be explained 
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by their focus on the funding components that are most productive of papers.  The 
American Paradox can be likewise explained since the Government funding component 
of GERD has been shown to be more important than overall GERD for the prediction of 
publishing.  The US has a larger GERD than the next four largest nations combined, and 
has been steadily increasing this funding for 30 years.  Despite this, it is now not 
surprising that its share of world paper production steadily decreased, because its share of 
the most decisive components Government investments and higher education spending 
have steadily decreased.  Mainly this is because of the well-known shift in the 
proportions of government and industrial investment in the US: from about 50%: 50% in 
1990 to about 30%:70% presently. 
 
The European Paradox is the perception that the EU does not reap the full economic 
benefits of its leadership of scientific paper production.  Our analysis also provides some 
insight into this observation.  Although the US leads the EU in total R&D funding 
(GERD), the focus in the EU member states on the components that encourage paper 
production make it more reasonable that the EU should lead the US on this indicator.  
Conversely, the US focuses on the components that encourage patent production make it 
more reasonable that that it should lead the EU on this indicator.  As shown in Figure 3, 
the EU is more efficient than the USA in obtaining patents from Industry funding. In 
summary, patents may be likely to lead more immediately to economic gains, but 
European research leading to papers represents a longer term investment. 
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Thus both the American and European Paradoxes seem to be the opposite sides of the 
same coin, reflecting complementary allocations of research investments.  Furthermore, 
they can be interpreted as merely alternate choice between emphases on long-term 
research and more immediate development. The US seems to function as a more 
integrated system than the EU—with more functional differentiation between public and 
private. One should also keep in mind that the US is integrated as a national system, 
while the EU is not (Leydesdorff, 2000). 
 
Let us finally note that regression models seem to be less useful in making forecasts for 
individual countries, since the composite slope and intercept of the regression line are 
based on averages over the dataset.  The regression process is most useful in identifying 
the input IVs that are most useful for predicting output indicators, which then can be used 
to build models for the individual countries in question. 
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